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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit grappled with constitutional
questions arising from the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Texas Supreme
Court settled a split of authority on compliance with Texas Family Code
Section 105.006 and the Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed
a non-biological parent’s standing to establish conservatorship after a
same-sex relationship ended. This article reviews Texas family law cases
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from federal and Texas courts during the Survey period from December
1, 2018 through November 30, 2019. The article excludes cases involving
the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Texas Office
of the Attorney General, and county Domestic Relations Offices. More
than 281,000 new family law cases were filed in 2018.1 The number of
cases reported annually exceeds the authors’ ability to report. Accord-
ingly, the authors have limited review to a few highlight cases and an
examination of trends of the past year.
II. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
A. BRACKEEN ET AL. V. BERNHARDT2
The 2019 version of this article3 discussed a decision from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas which declared
much of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional.4 On Au-
gust 9, 2019, a three judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed most of the district court’s decisions and found
ICWA to be constitutional.5
Brackeen et al. v. Bernhardt was filed by the State of Texas and foster
parents seeking to adopt a Native American child. Additional foster par-
ents and the states of Louisiana and Indiana were later added as plain-
tiffs. Defendants were the United States, several federal agencies and
their directors, along with five intervening Indian tribes.6 The district
court had ruled that ICWA and its clarifying administrative rules (known
as the Final Rule) violated equal protection, the Tenth Amendment, the
nondelegation doctrine, and the Administrative Procedures Act.7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the equal protection ruling.
At issue was whether the definition of an “Indian Child” was a race-
based classification requiring a strict scrutiny level of review or a political
classification requiring only a rational basis review. ICWA defined an
“Indian Child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and
is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.”8
1. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS
JUDICIARY 9 (2018), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443455/2018-ar-statistical-final.pdf.
The number of family law cases filed annually continues to increase and currently makes
up nearly half of the docket of Texas district courts. David Slayton, Preface to Office of
Court Administration, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY (2018).
2. The name of the first appellee changed from Ryan Zinke to David Bernhardt
when Mr. Bernhardt replaced Mr. Zinke as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Interior.
3. Anna K. Teller & Donald E. Teller, Jr., Family Law, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 131,
135–36 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 Survey].
4. Brackeen et al. v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536, 538 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
5. Brackeen et al. v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019).
6. Id. at 416.
7. Id.
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2018).
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The district court found that the “Indian Child” definition was a race-
based classification, applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine if
ICWA was sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to further a compelling gov-
ernment interest, and found that ICWA was not.9 Conversely, the Fifth
Circuit determined that the classification of an “Indian Child” was a po-
litical classification rather than a race-based classification.10 A child not
racially Indian could meet ICWA’s eligibility standard because of a bio-
logical parent being a member of a tribe, and some persons, though ra-
cially Indian, may not meet ICWA’s eligibility standard and thus not be
eligible for tribe membership. Because membership was not a proxy for
race, the Fifth Circuit found the classification was political rather than
race-based, and the rational basis standard of review was appropriate.11
Applying rational basis review, the Fifth Circuit found that “the special
treatment ICWA affords Indian children is rationally tied to Congress’s
fulfillment of its unique obligation toward Indian nations and its stated
purpose of ‘protect[ing] the best interests of Indian children and
promot[ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes.’”12 Therefore,
ICWA did not violate equal protection.13
The majority of the three judge panel also found that ICWA did not
violate the Tenth Amendment.14 The district court found that ICWA vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering doctrine15 and that
federal preemption16 did not apply.17 The Fifth Circuit found that ICWA
imposed notice and active efforts requirements on the “party” seeking
termination of parental rights or adoption of an Indian Child, but this
party could be a state agency or a private party and was thus even-
handed.18 ICWA’s requirement for states to take administrative action to
comply with federal standards was also not the same as administering a
federal program.19 Therefore, ICWA did not violate the anticom-
mandeering doctrine.20
Chief Judge Priscilla Owen dissented in part, concluding that portions
of ICWA violate the Tenth Amendment “because they direct state of-
ficers or agents to administer federal law.”21 For example, § 1915(e) re-
quires a state to keep records of efforts to comply with the statutory
9. Berhnardt, 937 F.3d at 428–29.
10. Id. at 429.
11. Id. at 428–29.
12. Id. at 430.
13. Id. at 441.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 430 (The anticommandeering doctrine “prohibits federal laws command-
ing the executive or legislative branch of a state government to act or refrain from
acting.”).
16. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S.
CONST. amend X.
17. Brackeen et al. v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 514, 541 (2018).
18. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 432–33.
19. Id. at 433.
20. Id. at 441.
21. Id. at 442 (Owen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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order of preference for placement of Indian children and to have those
records available for review upon request of the child’s tribe.22 The au-
thors concur with Chief Judge Owen.
The Fifth Circuit further disagreed with the district court regarding fed-
eral preemption. The district court had ruled that federal preemption did
not apply because ICWA regulated states rather than private citizens.
The Fifth Circuit said private individuals, namely Native American chil-
dren and families, were regulated and that the regulation conferred upon
them rights they would not have otherwise.23 Therefore, ICWA met the
minimum federal standards threshold and federal preemption did
apply.24
The Fifth Circuit then reviewed the district court’s ruling regarding the
nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation challenge questioned whether
ICWA delegated legislative power mandated to Congress to Indian
tribes. For example, sections of ICWA allowed tribes to employ tribal
resolutions to change the preferred placement order for Indian children
from the placement order listed in ICWA.25 The Fifth Circuit found this
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine because tribes have the inher-
ent right to exercise authority over their members.26 Therefore, the
ICWA statute was an incorporation of that authority, not a delegation of
congressional authority to the tribes.27
The Fifth Circuit then reviewed the Final Rule, the clarifying rules, and
regulations needed to implement ICWA. When originally promulgated in
1979, the Final Rule contained merely non-binding guidelines. However,
in 2016, the Final Rule was revised by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
and set as binding minimum standards to promote uniformity in how
ICWA was to be construed.28 The district court had found that the revi-
sions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but the Fifth
Circuit disagreed.29 The Fifth Circuit held that the revisions to the Final
Rule were reasonable and within the scope of the authority BIA received
from Congress.30
Three months after this opinion’s release, a request for en banc consid-
eration was granted. This matter will be reheard in 2020 by the full Fifth
Circuit.31 Multiple opinions should be expected.
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 23.141 (2017). Specifically, the regulations
require states to have their records available for review within fourteen days of a request
by the Secretary of Indian Affairs or the child’s tribe. Id.
23. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 434–35.
24. Id.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1978); 25 C.F.R. § 23.101, et seq. (2017).
26. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 437.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 441.
30. Id.
31. Brackeen et al. v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2019).
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III. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. HIGHSMITH V. HIGHSMITH
The 2018 Survey discussed Highsmith v. Highsmith out of the Seventh
Amarillo Court of Appeals.32 This case found that a mediated settlement
agreement (MSA) signed before the filing of a petition did not meet the
requirements of Texas Family Code Section 6.602(a) because Section
6.602(a) specifically stated that “the court may refer a suit for dissolution
of a marriage to mediation.”33 We advised practitioners in an abundance
of caution to file a petition prior to mediation to ensure the MSA would
be binding.
Thankfully, the Texas Supreme Court rectified this ruling in 2019. In
Highsmith v. Highsmith, the supreme court arrived at the opposite con-
clusion, stating that the requirements for a binding MSA are contained in
Section 6.602(b) and do not contain a requirement of a pending suit.34 So
long as the MSA complies with the binding requirements of Section
6.602(b), the referral authority provided in Section 6.602(a) will not re-
strict divorcing parties from engaging in binding mediation.35 A party is
entitled to judgment on an MSA that meets Section 6.602(b)’s require-
ments whether suit was filed before or after the MSA was signed.36
While the authors agree with this opinion, it does give rise to potential
problems. If the parties reach a binding mediated settlement but do not
file for divorce until years after the agreement, to what extent does it
remain binding? Children could be in another home, property awarded to
a party may no longer exist, or parties may no longer reside in Texas.
Future cases or statutory amendments will hopefully address these
concerns.
B. JONJAK V. GRIFFITH
When dividing brokerage or retirement accounts in MSAs, parties may
state the percentage or dollar amount that each spouse is awarded and
not add a phrase indicating that the award will fluctuate with the stock
market. The parties and attorneys may assume inclusion of gains or losses
language will be incorporated into the divorce decree and qualified do-
mestic relations order (QDRO). Jonjak v. Griffith37 exposes the risks of
32. Anna K. Teller & Donald E. Teller, Jr., Family Law, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 161,
168 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 Survey].
33. Highsmith v. Highsmith, 594 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017) (mem.
op.) (emphasis added), rev’d per curiam, 587 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Tex. 2019).
34. “A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement: (1)
provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or
underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation; (2) is signed by each party to
the agreement; and (3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time
the agreement is signed.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(b); see Highsmith v. Highsmith,
587 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).
35. Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 776.
36. Id. at 777; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(c).
37. See generally Jonjak v. Griffith, No. 03-18-00118-CV, 2019 WL 1576157 (Tex.
App.—Austin Apr. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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that assumption.
The parties’ MSA stated the wife, Griffith, “will receive $962,000 from
the Bog Farm Profit 401K, which is 53% of the value of the account as
represented by [Jonjak] on the date of the mediation via QDRO pre-
pared by [Jonjak].”38 The MSA did not address gains or losses occurring
after the date of mediation. Both parties prepared decrees and QDROs
dividing the 401K and a hearing on the competing decrees occurred ap-
proximately six months later. Jonjak’s proposed decree awarded Griffith
a flat $962,000.00 via QDRO. Griffith’s proposed decree awarded Griffith
53% of the account as of June 1, 2017, the date of the mediation, “to-
gether with any interest, dividends, gains, or losses on that amount arising
since that date” to be “more particularly defined” in a QDRO.39
Griffith argued that the addition of the gains and losses language was
merely a clarification but the Third Austin Court of Appeals rejected that
argument, stating that “[w]e may not rewrite or add to their agreement to
apply the account’s gains or losses to Griffith’s award.”40 The court of
appeals rendered ruling, modifying the decree and QDRO to award Grif-
fith $962,000.00 as of June 1, 2017, with no adjustment for gains and
losses.41
Assuming the 401K account increased in value during the six months
prior to the hearing and continued to fluctuate until the account was seg-
regated, Griffith lost a significant sum due to not including language in
the MSA indicating that the award was subject to fluctuation. Conversely,
if the 401K account value had fallen during the intervening months,
Jonjak would have been the party injured by the non-inclusion of fluctua-
tion language.42
Unanswered by this opinion is how the award to Jonjak was specified
in the MSA. If the MSA awarded Jonjak the remaining account balance
after the amount awarded to Griffith was segregated from the account,
Jonjak retained 100% of the increases to the account post-mediation,
even though that likely was not the parties’ intent. If the MSA awarded
Jonjak a specific dollar amount or percentage as of the mediation date
not subject to gains and losses, then any additions to the account would
be an undivided asset subject to future litigation to divide the asset. To be
safe, family law practitioners must include language in their MSAs indi-
cating that the brokerage or retirement award is subject to post-media-
tion fluctuations.
38. Id. at *1.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id. at *4.
42. Would the parties have argued opposite interpretations of the MSA if the stock
market had declined in the intervening months?
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IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. IN RE R.R.K.
In December, the Texas Supreme Court abrogated In re B.D., a deci-
sion questioned in the 2018 Survey.43 In In re B.D., the Fifth Dallas Court
of Appeals ruled that a trial court’s memorandum ruling was a final Suit
Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) judgment although the
ruling failed to meet the requirements of Section 105.006.44 Conse-
quently, the mother’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.45
In re R.R.K. presented the Texas Supreme Court a case with similar
facts.46 The In re R.R.K. trial court issued a one-page memorandum mod-
ification order and more than three months later signed a final order.47
Mother appealed after the final order was entered. Although the memo-
randum did not meet Section 105.006 requirements, the court of appeals
found that the appellate deadlines ran from the entry of the memoran-
dum and dismissed Mother’s appeal as untimely.48 In the supreme court
opinion, Justice Jane Bland acknowledged the courts of appeals’ split au-
thority on whether compliance with Section 105.006 should be considered
as a determining factor of the finality of an order.49 She explained that an
order must dispose of all claims in “clear and unequivocal language” to
be deemed a final order.50 An order that complies with the requirements
of Section 105.006 would clearly dispose of all claims; so compliance with
Section 105.006 is a relevant inquiry to finality. Justice Bland conceded
that omission of some requirements of Section 105.006 may not be fatal
to an order but compliance with the statute is evidence of the finality and
should play a role in determination of finality.51 The supreme court held
that “an order lacking the unmistakable language of finality—that is re-
solves all claims between and among the parties is final and appealable—
is ambiguous . . . when the order does not comport with the statue gov-
erning final orders,” and an appellate court should examine the record to
determine the trial court’s intent.52 In In re R.R.K., the record revealed
that the memorandum was not intended to be a final order, so Mother’s
appeal was deemed timely and the case was remanded for consideration
of the appeal.53
43. In re B.D., No. 05-17-00674-CV, 2017 WL 3765848 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31,
2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.), abrogated by In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. 2019); see
2018 Survey, supra note 32, at 182 (for a full discussion of the history of In re B.D.).
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006. The statute lists the personal information and
boldfaced typed notices to be included in final orders.
45. In re B.D., 2017 WL 3765848, at *2.
46. In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 538–39 (Tex. 2019).
47. Id. at 539.
48. Id. at 538.
49. Id. at 542.
50. Id. at 540.
51. Id. at 542–43.
52. Id. at 544.
53. Id.
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B. IN RE SWART
The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals conditionally granted writ and di-
rected a Dallas district court to vacate its order and dismiss a divorce
action filed by a wife who was in Texas on a tourist visa.54 Nora Morales
is a Bolivian citizen and a resident of Costa Rica. She traveled to Dallas
on a B1/B2 temporary tourist visa. The B1/B2 visa application required
Morales to overcome the presumption that she was immigrating to the
United States by demonstrating that her stay in Texas was temporary.
The visa was granted with the constraint that she must return to Bolivia
or Costa Rica every six months.55 Six months after arriving in Dallas,
Morales filed for divorce in Dallas district court. In her petition, she
claimed to have been domiciled in Texas for the preceding six months and
a resident of Dallas for the preceding ninety days. Her spouse, a Dutch
citizen and also a resident of Costa Rica, filed a special appearance which
the trial court denied. On mandamus, the court of appeals found
Morales’s domicile claim was barred as a matter of law because she relied
on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as the basis for her pres-
ence in Texas, and the regulations for the INA provided only for tempo-
rary stays.56 Therefore, Morales was a visitor who was not eligible to file
for divorce in Texas, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding
Morales met the statutory residence requirement.57
C. IN RE VENKATRAMAN
In 2018, we reported on In re Reardon.58 This case detailed a split in
authority amongst the courts of appeals regarding the ability to file a sub-
sequent child custody modification while the previous child custody de-
termination was on appeal.59 In re Venkatraman reiterates the Fifth
Dallas Court of Appeals precedent allowing for a new modification mat-
ter while the previous final order’s appeal was pending.60 Appellant’s pe-
tition for writ of mandamus filing, which argued that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to rule on a child support modification request while
the prior final order was on appeal, was denied.61
D. IN RE S.R.
The Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals case In re S.R. illustrates how
misunderstandings can occur when multiple filings and appeals are piled
54. In re Swart, 581 S.W.3d 844, 850–51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.).
55. Id. at 846.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (2014); 22 C.F.R. § 41.31 (2020).
57. In re Swart, 581 S.W.3d at 850–51.
58. See 2018 Survey, supra note 32, at 175–77.
59. In re E.W.N., 482 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); see also In
re G.E.D., No. 05-17-00169-CV, 2018 WL 258982, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 2, 2018,
no. pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing the split in authority).
60. See In re Venkatraman, No. 05-19-00088-CV, 2019 WL 698023 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 20, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
61. Id. at *1.
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upon each other.62 After trial, the district court signed a final modifica-
tion order, captioned 2nd Reformed Order in Suit to Modify Parent-
Child Relationship (2nd Reformed Order). The parties immediately filed
new modification petitions, and Mother also filed a timely appeal of the
2nd Reformed Order.63 The parties entered into a Rule 11 agreement for
the new modification matters which rendered the conservatorship, pos-
session, child support, medical support, and education expense issues
moot on appeal. However, the trial court’s 2nd Reformed Order, which
Mother appealed, had also found good cause to award Father a
$45,000.00 attorney’s fees judgment against Mother.64
Both parties argued that the Rule 11 settlement rendered the appeal of
the attorney’s fees award moot but arrived at opposite conclusions as to
how. Mother argued that the settlement of the moot issues also mooted
the attorney’s fees judgment because Father was not a “prevailing
party.”65 Father argued that the settlement mooted Mother’s appeal of
the attorney’s fees award, requiring it to stand. The court of appeals first
noted that Family Code Section 106.002, authorizing a trial court to
award attorney’s fees in a modification matter, did not require a party to
be named as the prevailing party in order to award attorney’s fees.66 Fur-
ther, the court echoed the Texas Supreme Court statement that a case “is
not rendered moot simply because some of the issues become moot dur-
ing the appellate process.”67 Accordingly, neither party was entitled to
have the attorney fee award dispensed with due to mootness.68 The court
then analyzed Mother’s complaint that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding attorney’s fees and found that the trial court did not.69
The court affirmed the trial court ruling as modified by the agreement.70
V. STANDING/SAME-SEX PARENTAGE
A. IN RE N.M.B.
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a
SAPCR requesting adjudication of conservatorship for a former same-sex
partner of the biological mother, affirming the trial court’s ruling that the
partner lacked standing.71 Channel Beverly was the partner who initiated
the SAPCR. Shante Posey lived with Channel Beverly when Posey con-
ceived N.M.B. through artificial insemination. N.M.B. was fifteen months
62. In re S.R., No. 02-16-00401-CV, 2018 WL 6816108, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
63. The parties have been litigating custody of their fourteen-year-old daughter since
she was four years old. Id. at *1.
64. See id. at *1–3.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *3–4.
67. Id. at *4 (quoting State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id.
71. In re N.M.B., No. 04-18-00111-CV, 2018 WL 6516120, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Dec. 12, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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old in July 2016 when the couple separated. Posey moved with N.M.B. to
Ohio for a short time after the separation but then returned to Texas.
Throughout the separation, Posey refused Beverly access to N.M.B. So, in
March 2017, Beverly filed a SAPCR.72 Posey moved to dismiss Beverly’s
SAPCR because Beverly lacked standing. The trial judge dismissed Bev-
erly’s suit with prejudice, and Beverly appealed.73 In her de novo review,
Justice Martinez did not reach the substance of Beverly’s first issue argu-
ing that she was an “intended parent” under Section 160.602(a)(8) of the
Family Code because Beverly did not plead for Chapter 160 relief.74 Sec-
tion 160.602(a)(8) pertains to proceedings to adjudicate parentage. While
Beverly’s pleadings included a section entitled petition to adjudicate par-
entage, the relief she requested was Chapter 153 relief for conservator-
ship, possession, and access.75 Section 102.003, not Section 160.602(a)(8),
confers standing for Chapter 153 relief.76 Since the requested relief was
not available under the standing statute pled, the court overruled Bev-
erly’s first issue.77 When addressing the issues presented in In re N.M.B.,
practitioners should plead in the alternative and ensure their pleadings
request relief available under all applicable standing statutes.
Justice Martinez rejected several of Beverly’s additional arguments be-
cause standing, like all subject matter jurisdiction issues, is a question of
law.78 Beverly is a party to a separate pending lawsuit brought by the
Office of Attorney General to adjudicate N.M.B.’s parentage that is set
for trial in March 2020.79 It will be interesting to see if she prevails as to
standing in that case.
VI. PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
A. CHAKRABARTY V. GANGULY
The Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals sat en banc to reconsider whether
money is “tangible personal property” subject to the two-year statute of
limitations of Section 9.003(a).80 Under Section 9.003(a), an enforcement
action for division of personal property that exists at the time of the di-
72. Beverly’s petition was for divorce or, in the alternative, a SAPCR to adjudicate
parentage. In both the divorce and SAPCR portions of the petition, she sought joint man-
aging conservatorship of N.M.B. Judge Peter Sakai dismissed the divorce case because he
found the parties’ relationship was not an informal marriage. Beverly did not appeal dis-
missal of the divorce action. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
74. See generally id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602(a)(8).
75. See generally In re N.M.B., 2018 WL 6516120, at *4; see also TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153, et seq.
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003.
77. In re N.M.B., 2018 WL 6516120, at *3–4.
78. Beverly’s arguments for estoppel, application of the contract-law based ratification
doctrine, and equitable tolling all failed because standing must be conferred via statute. See
id. at *2.
79. Id.
80. Chakrabarty v. Ganguly, 573 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.)
(en banc); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.003(a). The case was heard en banc because a prior
panel decision from the same court reached a contrary decision.
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vorce must be filed before the second anniversary of the date of di-
vorce.81 “Tangible personal property” is not defined in the Family Code.
Former husband, Chakrabarty, appealed the Collin County trial court’s
enforcement order arguing that the action for enforcement of division of
funds was barred by the Section 9.003(a) statute of limitation.82
Chakrabarty’s appeal was heard by a three-justice appellate panel. Ap-
pellee, Ganguly, relied on a Texas Supreme Court case and opinions from
other Texas courts of appeals to rebut the assertion that cash is “tangible
personal property” subject to the two-year limitation.83 During oral argu-
ments, the panel noted that a previous panel of the Fifth Dallas Court of
Appeals had considered this issue and held that money was “tangible per-
sonal property.”84 Since subsequent panels of a court of appeals are
bound by previous panel opinions, Husband prevailed on his statute of
limitations argument in the 2018 panel opinion. Wife moved for rehearing
en banc, and the motion was granted. Rehearing en banc is granted as the
court deems necessary.85 Granting the en banc motion was necessary for
the court to reexamine this issue, as panel opinions can be overruled only
by later en banc decisions or supreme court decisions.
Justice David Schenck reviewed the authority relied on by Ganguly. He
explained that in interpreting the relevant tax statute in Great South Life
Insurance Co. v. City of Austin, the supreme court held that money was
“intangible” personal property.86 While this holding is not directly on
point as to the definition of “tangible personal property” in Section
9.003(a), it can be presumed that the supreme court would follow their
previous ruling in defining the phrase as used in the Family Code.87 It can
further be presumed the legislature intended the same definition to apply
in later enacted statutes as earlier statutes and that the legislature is
aware of judicial opinions interpreting statutory definitions and adopts
those definitions in later enacted statutes.88 So, the definition of money
from Great South Life Insurance Co. is persuasive authority that money is
not “tangible personal property” under Section 9.003(a). Turning to the
decisions from the sister courts of appeals, Justice Schenck first examined
an enforcement case from the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals. The
court of appeals used definitions from the tax code, Black’s Law Diction-
81. The time for tolling is the second anniversary of (a) rendering of the decree or (b)
the date the decree becomes final after appeal, whichever is later. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.003(a).
82. The parties’ divorce was granted in 2012, and the former wife filed for enforce-
ment in 2016, unquestionably after expiration of the two-year statute of limitations.
Chakrabarty, 573 S.W.3d at 414.
83. See generally id.
84. Id. at 415; Long v. Long, 196 S.W.3d 460, 468 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
85. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.2(c).
86. Great S. Life Ins. Co v. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778, 781 (Tex. 1922). “[C]ertain
classes of . . . personal property, as well as intangible property having similar characteris-
tics, as for example, money, state and municipal bonds, circulating band notes, and shares
of stock . . . .” Id.
87. Chakrabarty, 573 S.W.3d at 416.
88. Id.
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ary, and two Supreme Court decisions and found, “. . . money is not a
‘tangible chattel’ or ‘goods.’”89 Two other courts of appeals also rejected
the argument that money was “tangible personal property.”90 Following
“[p]rior judicial interpretations of the same terms, particularly where, as
here, those constructions are uniform, include a decisive reading from a
terminal court, and cover a vast expanse of time,” the Dallas Court of
Appeals stated that money and shares of stock are not tangible personal
property under Section 9.003(a).91 The trial court’s judgment on this issue
was affirmed.92
VII. INTERSECTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS AND FAMILY LAW
A. MUSTAFA V. PENNINGTON
Family law practitioners continued to apply the Texas Citizens Par-
ticipatory Act (TCPA) to their cases in 2019. As discussed in the 2019
Survey, the TCPA was intended to protect defendants from costly litiga-
tion designed to keep them from exercising their constitutional rights to
petition, speak freely, and participate in government.93 The broad defini-
tions in TCPA of “legal action,” “right to petition,” and “communica-
tion”94 allowed its application to a wide range of civil cases. Protecting
free speech is a paramount right, but the broad definitions arguably led to
the application of TCPA to cases where its purpose is not furthered. Ap-
plication of TCPA to family law matters was recently criticized by the
Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals.95
In Mustafa v. Pennington, appellant Mustafa sued Pennington, the ami-
cus attorney appointed to assist the court during a child custody case.96
After a jury trial in which Pennington participated, the jury named Mus-
tafa’s ex-wife as sole managing conservator. While the custody case was
89. Ford v. Ford, No. 14-99-00246-CV, 2000 WL 1262469, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 7, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
90. See Wilke v. Phillips, No. 04-12-00604-CV, 2013 WL 6022245, at *2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gentile v. Gentile, No. 13-04-167-CV,
2007 WL 271144, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 1, 2007, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
91. Chakrabarty, 573 S.W.3d at 416–17 (quoting Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525,
529 (Tex. 1984)).
92. Id.
93. 2019 Survey, supra note 3, at 138–40.
94. A “legal action” included any judicial filing requesting legal or equitable relief.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6) (version before 2019 revisions). The
“right to petition” includes a communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding. Id.
§ 27.001(4)(A)(i). A “communication” is “the making or submitting of a statement or doc-
ument in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.”
Id. § 27.001(1).
95. Misko v. Johns, 575 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (“based
upon the broad definitions in the statute, parties have sought to apply the protections of
the TCPA to an increasing range of situations that do not further this purpose, including
filing motions to dismiss (1) a suit affecting the parent-child relationship under the family
code”).
96. Mustafa v. Pennington, No. 03-18-00081-CV, 2019 WL 1782993 (Tex. App.—Aus-
tin Apr. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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on appeal, Mustafa filed a breach of contract, negligence, and defamation
case against Pennington. Pennington moved to dismiss the case under the
TCPA. In response, Mustafa amended his suit, dropped his defamation
claim, and stated intent to nonsuit any claims that invoke the TCPA.97
Mustafa continued to litigate his breach of contract claim and filed dis-
covery requests. At the TCPA hearing, the court denied the discovery
requests and dismissed Mustafa’s case pursuant to the TCPA. The trial
court also awarded Pennington the TCPA’s required attorney’s fees and
expenses.98
On appeal, the Third Austin Court of Appeals found that the legal ac-
tion was based on or related to Pennington’s right to petition, invoking
the TCPA. Mustafa argued that his allegations were that Pennington
failed to communicate, rather than communicate, as defined by the
TCPA. The court of appeals recast Mustafa’s alleged failure to communi-
cate as a criticism of Pennington’s communications.99 Therefore, the
court found that the TCPA applied, despite Mustafa’s attempt to nonsuit
any claims invoking the TCPA.100
Having found that the TCPA applied, the burden shifted to Mustafa,
who could only avoid dismissal if he could establish clear and specific
evidence for a prima facie case on each essential element of his claim.101
The court of appeals found that Mustafa was unable to establish a prima
facie case that an express or implied contract existed between Mustafa
and Pennington, and therefore affirmed the dismissal of the suit.102
B. LIPPER V. HAYNES
Lipper v. Haynes also involved an attorney using the TCPA to dismiss a
suit.103 Attorney Lipper represented Wife Alicia in a divorce case against
Husband Haynes and also simultaneously represented a lender against
Haynes in a separate suit. The suit on the promissory note settled, and the
divorce case proceeded to trial. During the bench trial, Lipper acknowl-
edged that he had inadvertently applied a time entry from the promissory
note case onto the summary of his attorney’s fees for the divorce case.104
Despite Lipper’s admission, the court awarded attorney’s fees based on
the billing without adjusting for the inadvertent time entry.105
Rather than appeal the divorce matter, Haynes sued Lipper and Alicia
for breach of contract, tortious interference, and conspiracy. Lipper
moved to have the suit dismissed under the TCPA but the trial court de-
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at *4.
103. Haynes v. Lipper, Nos. 01-19-00055-CV, 01-19-00345-CV, 2019 WL 3558999, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
104. See id.
105. See id.
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nied his motion.106 Lipper then filed an interlocutory appeal alleging that
the denial of his motion to dismiss was error. The First Houston Court of
Appeals reviewed the matter and agreed, finding that the definitions
under the TCPA unambiguously included an attorney’s in-court state-
ments, and therefore applied the TCPA to Hayne’s claims against Lip-
per.107 The court of appeals remanded the matter back to the trial court
for a determination of the attorney’s fees and sanctions to be assessed
against Haynes.108
The Mustafa and Lipper cases could be seen as a quick and thus proper
vehicle to dismiss dubious cases, but the authors envisioned improper ex-
tension of the TCPA to less narrowly tailored family law matters. Luckily,
the Texas Legislature stepped in and, effective September 1, 2019, dra-
matically narrowed the scope of the TCPA, exempting many civil litiga-
tion matters from the TCPA. Important to family law practitioners, legal
actions under Title 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the Family Code, as well as an applica-
tion for a protective order under criminal laws, were exempted from the
TCPA.109 Alternative dispute resolution proceedings and post-judgment
enforcement actions were also expressly removed from the definition of a
“legal action.”110 The legislative changes should allow the TCPA to be
applied to civil actions such as Mustafa and Lipper while prohibiting the
extension of the TCPA into areas of family law where it was not intended.
C. GUIMARAES V. BRANN
The First Houston Court of Appeals denied reconsideration en banc of
Marcelle Guimaraes’s appeal in the ongoing cross-border custody litiga-
tion between Ms. Guimaraes and her former husband, Christopher
Brann.111 The parties filed competing cases in Harris County and Brazil,
which led to extended litigation. This mandamus was based on subject
matter jurisdiction issues raised by Guimaraes. In a three-justice appel-
late panel opinion issued in July 2018, the court of appeals determined
106. See id.
107. The appellate court further ruled that even if Haynes was successful in establishing
a prima facie case against Lipper by clear and specific evidence, the attorney immunity
defense still entitled Lipper to dismissal of Hayne’s claims under the TCPA. Id. at *3.
Establishing an affirmative defense as a matter of law allows the matter to still be dis-
missed despite the party bringing the claim being able to establish a prima facie case. TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(d).
108. Lipper, 2019 WL 3558999, at *4.
109. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(6).
110. Id. § 27.001(6).
111. Guimaraes v. Brann, 583 S.W.3d 652, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no
pet.) (Keyes, J., dissenting); see 2019 Survey, supra note 3, at 138 (discussing a small part of
the previous litigation between these parents.). See also Samantha Ketterer, Harris County
Judge Denies Dismissal of Suit Against Kidnapped Boy’s Father, HOUS. CHRONICLE (May
28, 2019, 6:17 PM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-
County-judge-denies-dismissal-of-suit-13902103.php [https://perma.cc/L7PF-RY3R] (dis-
cussing the ongoing litigation between Christopher Brann and his son’s maternal grandpar-
ents. Both grandparents were sentenced to federal prison in 2018 for aiding their daughter
in the kidnapping of her son. The grandparents allege Brann made false statements in their
criminal trials.).
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there was no question of subject matter jurisdiction and instead recast the
issue as one of international comity.112 The principle of international
comity gives discretionary power to a Texas court with subject-matter ju-
risdiction to defer to a foreign court. In Guimaraes, the Harris County
trial court could have deferred to the Brazilian court after the Brazilian
court assumed jurisdiction under two exceptions to the Hague Conven-
tion, but the court chose not to defer.113 Dismissal of a Texas case under
comity is not a right, and a trial court’s decision not to extend comity is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.114 The panel found the Harris County
district court did not abuse its discretion when it “[r]efused to extend
comity to the Brazilian courts’ resolution of Brann’s Hague Convention
Petition,” that resolution being to deny Brann’s request for his son to be
returned to the United States.115 Guimaraes’s argument that, under the
Hague Convention, the trial court “‘must give deference’ to the Brazilian
court,” was soundly rejected and the panel affirmed the trial court judg-
ment.116 Guimaraes filed a request for en banc reconsideration that was
denied, and Justice Evelyn Keyes filed a dissenting opinion.117 She ex-
plained that the panel went awry by “only selectively address[ing] appli-
cation of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),” to
return of a child under the Hague Convention118 and failing to apply the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
which directly addresses jurisdictional questions in international disputes,
to the issues Guimaraes presented.119 Justice Keyes found that failure to
apply the applicable statutory standards resulted in an unjust ruling.120
The thrust of the dissent is that the appellate panel sidestepped the juris-
dictional issue of whether the Brazilian court had adequate grounds to
assume jurisdiction. The Hague Convention and related statutes are
meant to provide courts with mechanisms to avoid cross-border fights,
but the statutes must be appropriately applied to be effective. Justice
Keyes flatly stated that the controversy in this case is jurisdictional and
she would have granted en banc consideration and voted for Brazil to
assume jurisdiction.121 These questions remain: (1) did the Brazilian court
obtain jurisdiction even though (a) Brann filed his petition less than a
112. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 653, 663; see Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521,
536–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
113. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 662–63. If a child is wrongfully removed from their
home country, courts in Hague Convention signatory countries are obligated to return the
child if a timely petition is filed and no exception to return is applicable. The Brazilian
Court found two applicable exceptions, that (1) the child was well-settled in Brazil, and (2)
returning the child to the United States would put the child in grave risk of harm. Id. See
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 12 & 13(b),
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670; 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2018).
114. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 663.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see Guimaraes, 562 S.W.3d at 532, 537.
117. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 652.
118. Id. at 653 (Keyes. J., dissenting); see 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2018).
119. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 653; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.
120. Guimaraes, 583 S.W.3d at 653.
121. Id. at 663.
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year after the child’s wrongful removal so the Article 12 “well-settled ex-
ception” is arguably not applicable and (b) if there was no grave danger
to the child;122 or (2) was the Texas court divested of jurisdiction by the
Brazilian court’s resolution denying Brann’s request for his son to be re-
turned to the United States.123
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, a Fifth Circuit panel opinion found the In-
dian Child Welfare Act and related regulations constitutional. Their deci-
sion will be reconsidered by the full Fifth Circuit this year. The Texas
Supreme Court settled a split of authority on compliance with Texas Fam-
ily Code Section 105.006 and explained the requirements of Texas Family
Code Section 6.602(a). The trend of the Texas courts of appeals seems to
support district courts having authority to hear modification matters
when an appeal of a prior child custody order is pending.
122. The grave danger to the child argument stems from allegations that Brann had
violent episodes and is supported by his admissions and Guimaraes’s testimony. Brann
maintained his son is safe with him. The Brazilian court found that returning the child to
Brann would put the child in danger of harm because of Brann’s violent tendencies and the
emotional damage that would be caused by separating a four-year-old from his Mother.
The Texas court may view the evidence differently. Id. at 655, 659.
123. Id. at 663, 669.
